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Brown v. Plata: The Struggle to
Harmonize Human Dignity with
the Constitution
Benjamin F. Krolikowski*
I.

Introduction

In May 2011, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Brown v. Plata, affirming a lower court’s decision to grant a
prison population reduction order in accordance with the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), affecting the
imprisonment of thousands of prisoners in the State of
California.1 The nature of the Court’s decision makes Plata
perhaps the most noteworthy prisoners’ rights decision of the
past quarter-century.2 In reaching this decision, the Court
applied the provisions of the PLRA governing the grant of
prison population reduction orders.3 Despite the seemingly
simple application of the PLRA, understanding this decision
requires one to examine the Court’s recognition of the human
dignity of all persons, even those who have voluntarily forfeited
some portion of their liberty by committing crime, and its role
in determining the content of important constitutional rights.
Human dignity as a constitutional value has affected the
Court’s decision-making only since the 1940’s.4 In the ensuing

* J.D. Candidate – Pace University School of Law, May 2013. I would
like to first thank my family and friends for their love and support
throughout the writing of this Article and my time in law school, without it I
would not be where I am today. I would also like to thank Professor Michael
B. Mushlin, who was instrumental in providing the spark that inspired my
research in this area of the law—without his encouragement, constant
guidance, and keen interest in my writing, this Article would never have
escaped beyond my mind’s eye.
1. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
2. 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 17:1.60 (4th ed. Supp.
2009).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).
4. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L.
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seventy years the Court has increasingly relied on human
dignity as a value considered in its interpretation of the
Constitution. Even philosophically estranged members of the
Court have found common ground on the issue.5
In Plata, the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that prisoners alleging
conditions of confinement claims retain some degree of human
dignity despite their lawful incarceration.6 Accordingly, federal
courts must enforce the constitutional rights of prisoners when
they are violated, even if this culminates in the release of some
individuals from captivity. This is in stark contrast to previous
cases where the federal courts have simply deferred to the
judgment of prison administrators.7 Plata emphatically affirms
the judiciary’s role in protecting prisoners’ rights, noting that
court inaction in the face of ongoing and persistent
constitutional violations cannot remain simply because of
prison administrators’ protestations and despite the admittedly
radical nature of the remedy being considered.8
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the evolution of
human dignity as a constitutional value during the course of
the twentieth century. This Article will explain the
philosophical development of human dignity in general terms
and as it was developed by the Supreme Court, with some
particular attention given the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part III will discuss Plata and its underlying
facts. Part IV concerns how Plata may influence the use of
human dignity as a constitutional value in the years to come,
specifically discussing the relationship between Plata and the
troublesome 2012 decision: Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders.9 As a result of cases like Plata and Florence, the
vitality of human dignity as a constitutional value today
REV. 169, 188 (2011).
5. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 (majority opinion by Kennedy, J.); Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-81 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (majority opinion
by Frankfurter, J.).
6. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.
7. 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1:3 (4th ed. 2009).
8. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928-29.
9. 566 U.S. ____, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
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remains somewhat in flux. However, this is not to say that it is
irrelevant to the Court’s decision-making process. Only as
future cases are decided will commentators be able to
determine which case holds greater import in the area of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and thus evaluate the
durability of human dignity as a constitutional concern.
II. Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value
A.

Human Dignity & Philosophy

Human dignity has only recently emerged as a value
relevant to interpreting the Constitution.10 Moreover, it is a
concept that is not susceptible to easy definition. The
ephemeral nature of human dignity has led some legal scholars
to declare that human dignity is either not an independent
constitutional value, or that human dignity can be reduced to
another, more concrete and readily discernible value like
personal autonomy or equality.11 Despite the philosophic
debate, it is increasingly apparent that the Supreme Court has
relied on some human dignity value, whatever that may be, in
reaching decisions on a wide-ranging number of issues.12
Human dignity originated separately as both a religious
and philosophical concept. The religious underpinnings of
human dignity derive from the Judeo-Christian belief that all
human beings are created in the image of God.13 Each
individual therefore contains a fragment of the so-called “divine
spark,” imbuing him or her with a dignity that cannot be
denied or in any way disparaged by others.14 This conception of
human dignity explains rudimentary notions of human
equality, best demonstrated by the retributivist belief in “blood
for blood” that is enshrined in many ancient legal and religious

10. Henry, supra note 4, at 188.
11. Id. at 182-85.
12. See Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 753 (2006).
13. Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law,
14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 205 (2008).
14. Id. at 206.
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texts.15
Philosophically, the idea that human dignity is a source of
human rights can be traced to the work of the eighteenth
century German philosopher Immanuel Kant.16 Kant based his
understanding of human dignity on the individual autonomy he
believed was possessed by all people.17 Individual autonomy, to
Kant, was the same as positive freedom, which is derived from
a person’s inherent rationality and ability to self-govern.18
Kant’s conception of human dignity is particularly interesting
in examining human dignity as a constitutional value because
his work was an intellectual product of the Enlightenment,
much like the Constitution. This is not to imply that Kant’s
philosophy directly inspired the Framers in drafting the
Constitution; however, it does show that political and legal
thought at the time was concerned to some degree with human
equality and its relationship to the inherent dignity of all
people.19
B.

The Supreme Court and Human Dignity

During the first 150 years of the Nation’s existence, the
word “dignity” appeared in Supreme Court opinions to describe
only the sovereignty possessed by the several states, typically
in cases concerning the application of the Eleventh
Amendment.20
Human
dignity
as
an
independent
constitutional concept did not enter the Supreme Court lexicon
until the middle part of the twentieth century. It was not until
the 1940’s that this new understanding of “dignity” was first
recognized as a means of vindicating individual rights under

15. Id.
16. Id.; William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY & AMERICAN VALUES 47, 53
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).
17. Rao, supra note 13, at 206.
18. Michael J. Meyer, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY & AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 16, at 1, 7.
19. Id.; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
20. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-50 (1908); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419, 451 (1793) (opinion of Blair, J.).
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the Constitution.21 This change can in part be explained by the
global response to the Holocaust and other World War II era
atrocities, resulting in the signing of great international
agreements such as the United Nations Charter, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.22
1.Justice Frank Murphy
The individual most responsible for developing human
dignity as a constitutional value in the twentieth century was
Justice Frank Murphy.23 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
appointed Justice Murphy to the Court in 1940.24 Prior to his
appointment, Justice Murphy served as Mayor of Detroit and
Governor of Michigan, where he developed an accentuated
sensitivity to the severe problem posed by extreme racism in
America.25 Deeply affected by what he saw in elected office,
Justice Murphy’s jurisprudence assumed that the Constitution
protected the inherent dignity of all persons by virtue of their
shared humanity.26 While his philosophy was mostly expressed
in dissent,27 using dignity to inform the Court’s understanding
of the Constitution set the foundation for its growth during the
latter half of the twentieth century.
The particular phrase “human dignity” was first used to
vindicate individual rights in Justice Murphy’s dissenting
opinion in Korematsu v. United States.28 Railing against the
Court’s decision to uphold President Roosevelt’s wartime
Japanese exclusion policy, Justice Murphy condemned the

21. Rao, supra note 13, at 202.
22. Goodman, supra note 12, at 750; U.N. Charter preamble; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
23. Goodman, supra note 12, at 753-54.
24. In Memory of Mr. Justice Murphy, 340 U.S. v, xii (1951).
25. Id. at ix–x.
26. See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES & TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 184, 248-49 (2010).
27. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134-35 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-35 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
28. 325 U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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policy as unalloyed racism.29 The detention of persons based on
their race, “destroy[ed] the dignity of the individual . . .” and
was a policy more worthy of the enemy Axis Powers than of the
United States.30 In one of the Court’s lowest historical
moments,31 Justice Murphy fully grasped the implications of
allowing the government’s position to stand unchallenged by
the Constitution’s clear commands. If one thing distinguished
the United States from its enemies, Justice Murphy believed it
was the nation’s constitutional commitment to protect human
dignity. To him, even the arguable exigencies of war were
insufficient to vitiate the clear commands of the Constitution
and the rights that it protects.32
Justice Murphy also relied on the constitutional
recognition of human dignity in his dissent in Screws v. United
States.33 In Screws, the issue was whether local officials, acting
under the color of Georgia law, could face federal prosecution
for a racially motivated murder. The defendants in Screws
arrested an African American male charged with the theft of a
tire, and proceeded to viciously beat the suspect to death,
clearly without any due process.34 The Court upheld the
validity of the prosecution, but reversed the defendants’
conviction due to inadequate jury instructions.35 In his dissent,
Justice Murphy argued that both the prosecution and the
conviction should have been affirmed, writing:
I dissent. Robert Hall, a Negro citizen, has been
deprived not only of the right to be tried by a

29. See id. at 239-42.
30. Id. at 240.
31. See FELDMAN, supra note 26, at 243; Dawinder S. Sidhu, First
Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime
Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV.
419, 425 (2010); Nathan Watanabe, Note, Internment, Civil Liberties, and a
Nation in Crisis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 185 (2003).
32. Cf. Ex parte Milligan 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1886) (“The
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”).
33. 325 U.S. 91, 134-35 (1945) (Murphy J., dissenting).
34. See id. 92-93 (majority opinion).
35. Id. at 107.
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court rather than by ordeal. He has been
deprived of the right of life itself. That right
belonged to him not because he was a Negro or a
member of any particular race or creed. That
right was his because he was an American
citizen, because he was a human being. As such,
he was entitled to all the respect and fair
treatment that befits the dignity of man, a
dignity that is recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitution.36
To Justice Murphy, the issue in Screws transcended the
technical question of whether federal jurisdiction was proper.
The crime committed in Screws, a brutal and racially
motivated murder, implicated the Constitution because Robert
Hall failed to receive even the smallest degree of due process
and was instead beaten to death. The local officials, according
to Justice Murphy, could not have been unaware that their
actions, taken under color of state law, were violative of the
due process guarantees enshrined in the Constitution.37
“Knowledge of a comprehensive law library is unnecessary for
officers of the law to know that the right to murder individuals
in the course of their duties is unrecognized in this nation.”38
That due process is constitutionally compelled, and that it was
disregarded in the instant case was clear to Justice Murphy
because of his understanding of the Constitution as a document
grounded on respect for human dignity.
Justice Murphy was a tireless advocate for advancing the
cause of human dignity in American jurisprudence. He
recognized that many of the basic rights enumerated in the
Constitution were themselves tools to protect the inherent
dignity of humanity. However, he was unable to see this
constitutional theory blossom any further; he died, still on the
bench, on July 19, 1949.39 Several years would pass before
another jurist would take up the mantle on behalf of

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 134-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136-37.
In Memory of Mr. Justice Murphy, 340 U.S. v, vi (1951).
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constitutional human dignity.
2.Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., picked up the fight for
constitutional human dignity where Justice Murphy left off
and went on to become its leading champion for the remainder
of the twentieth century. Appointed to the Supreme Court by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956, Justice Brennan
served on the Court for over thirty years, becoming perhaps the
most ardent supporter of the constitutional importance of
human dignity in the Court’s history, past and present.40
Discussing the human dignity of the incarcerated, Justice
Brennan once famously wrote, “even the vilest criminal
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.”41
Justice Brennan thought that the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the revolution in constitutional jurisprudence that it fostered,
was the crucial provision that made human dignity a
constitutionally relevant value, protecting it from depredations
by state governments on individual rights.42 Justice Brennan
consistently argued that human dignity was the paramount
value underlying the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
“cruel and unusual punishment.”43 He understood that
“conceptions of ‘liberty’ have come to recognize the undeniable
proposition that prisoners and parolees retain some vestiges of
human dignity.”44 While human dignity and liberty may be
constitutionally related, this did not make one a mere
derivative of the other.
Justice Brennan discussed his conception of human dignity
and its constitutional dimensions at great length in Furman v.

40. See Stephen J. Wermiel, Essay, Law and Human Dignity: The
Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 228 (1998).
41. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
42. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 535, 536 (1986).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
44. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492 (1977).
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Georgia,45 where the Court held that the death penalty, as then
applied throughout the United States, was unconstitutional.46
Despite finding the Eighth Amendment incapable of precise
definition, Justice Brennan strongly believed that the
amendment embodies certain values central to American
government.47 Building on the foundation laid in Trop v.
Dulles,48 Justice Brennan concluded that a punishment, in this
case the death penalty, is “cruel or unusual” when “it does not
comport with human dignity.”49 He concluded that, at the most
general level, government action does not violate the Eighth
Amendment where it respects the intrinsic value of the
individual subjected to punishment.50
Going much further than the per curiam opinion, Justice
Brennan applied a four-factor analysis in concluding that the
death penalty absolutely violated the Eighth Amendment by
denigrating human dignity. “The primary principle is that a
punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the
dignity of human beings.”51 The severity of the punishment
referenced by Justice Brennan does not simply refer to the
infliction of pain, but also to punishments that “treat members
of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with
and discarded.”52 A punishment also violates human dignity
where the sheer enormity of the punishment imposed on the
convicted is degrading in and of itself, as was the case in
Trop.53 Moreover, severe punishment is inconsistent with
human dignity where it is arbitrarily inflicted by the State.54
Punishment is arbitrarily inflicted “when, without reason, [the
State] inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it
does not inflict upon others.”55 Human dignity is also affected
where a punishment is inflicted that is considered
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 258.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id.
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“unacceptable to contemporary society.”56 A determination that
a punishment has been rejected by contemporary society, as a
depredation on human dignity, requires the presence of
“objective indicators,” such as the contemporary and historical
use of the punishment being examined, demonstrating a
society’s current acceptance of that form of punishment.57
Finally, severe punishment does not comport with human
dignity where it is “excessive,” that is, “unnecessary.”58 “The
infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport
with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless
infliction of suffering.”59 Where a significantly less severe
punishment is available, a severe punishment is unnecessary
because it is disproportionate to the offense.60
In summary, Justice Brennan concluded that a
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment when it degrades
human dignity. The four general principles that he elucidated
in his concurring opinion were aimed at providing “means by
which a court can determine whether a challenged punishment
comports with human dignity.”61 Each of the above-mentioned
factors merely provides a judicial gloss to the term human
dignity. Justice Brennan’s analysis assumes that human
dignity was the core value that the Framers wanted to protect
through the enactment of the Eighth Amendment.62 His
analysis in Furman used human dignity as the metric to
determine when punishment crosses the line, but did not alter
the ability of the government to reduce the liberty of
individuals convicted of committing a crime. His analysis
assumed that these individuals possess a lesser degree of
constitutional liberty than the rest of society. However, Justice
Brennan was convinced that commission of crime was not a
blank check for the deprivation of all rights. No commentator
has seriously challenged this contention; however, there has
been strong disagreement as to when the line between
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 277.
See id. at 278-79.
Id. at 279.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 282.
See id. at 270.
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constitutional and unconstitutional punishment has been
crossed. Justice Brennan’s approach to human dignity
attempts to create some predictability in drawing this
constitutional line, while also championing the basic
understandings of the Framers with regard to the Eighth
Amendment.
Justice Brennan also identified human dignity as a
constitutional value in his majority opinion in Goldberg v.
Kelly.63 In Goldberg, the Court considered whether welfare
recipients were entitled to any due process, such as an
evidentiary hearing, prior to the termination of their welfare
benefits.64 Conducting evidentiary hearings after the
termination of welfare benefits was problematic because,
without those benefits, individuals dependent on welfare were
generally left without any other means to provide for
themselves. “[The] need to concentrate upon finding the means
for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects [the welfare
recipient’s] ability to seek redress from the welfare
bureaucracy.”65 Finding that due process requires a predeprivation hearing, Justice Brennan upheld what he termed
to be “the Nation’s basic commitment . . . to foster the dignity
and well-being of all persons within its borders.”66 Goldberg
recognized that human dignity is relevant not only where the
government acts to impinge upon the liberty of its citizens, but
also where the government positively acts to assist the plight of
the most unfortunate members of society.
C.

The Eighth Amendment & Human Dignity67

The Eight Amendment reads: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”68 The Supreme Court first highlighted
of the obvious connection between the Eighth Amendment and

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 264–65 (emphasis added).
See also discussion of the Furman case supra Section II.B.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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to the concept of human dignity in Trop v. Dulles, the
landmark decision that defined the scope of that amendment.69
Trop considered whether expatriation of a wartime deserter
was valid punishment under the Eighth Amendment.70 In
finding this punishment to be “cruel and unusual,” Chief
Justice Warren explained, “[t]he basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”71
In essence, the driving force behind the Eighth Amendment
was to protect and preserve human dignity from severe
encroachments by government.72 Moving on from that premise,
the Court concluded that whether some form of punishment is
compatible with the Eighth Amendment depends on whether it
is “within the limits of civilized standards.”73 This fluidic
concept “draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”74 Justice
Brennan, in Furman v. Georgia, considered in greater detail
how contemporary values concerning punishment implicated
human dignity and related values.75 The protections afforded
by the Eighth Amendment were made applicable to the states
by the Court in Robinson v. California, decided in 1962.76
The prisoners’ rights movement is just one area of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence where human dignity as a
constitutional value has played a role in the Court’s decisionmaking process. Implicit in the application of the Eighth
Amendment to prisoners’ conditions of confinement claims is
the idea that prisoners retain some degree of human dignity
and are therefore vested with limited constitutional protection.
While this does not mean that the incarcerated cannot be
deprived of liberties possessed by law-abiding citizens, it
recognizes that certain aspects of personal liberty remain after

69. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 100.
72. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
73. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
74. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
75. See supra notes 55-56.
76. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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conviction and incarceration.77 Many Supreme Court decisions
in this field recognize this fact; however, these decisions
usually balance the rights retained by prisoners against the
interests of prison administrators in operating the prison
system safely and efficiently.78 In the past, courts have given
great deference to the prerogatives of these administrators. In
Estelle v. Gamble,79 one of the first landmark prisoners’ rights
cases, the Court held that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
serious medical condition constituted “cruel and unusual
punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. The Court
recognized that the Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
and decency . . . .”80 Unfortunately, in the ensuing decades,
human dignity has not played a prominent role in many of the
Court’s opinions.81 When references to human dignity appear in
the pages of the United States Reports, they have mostly been
confined to concurrences82 and dissents.83 Brown v. Plata
marks, perhaps, a change in the opposite direction due to its
strong language embracing the vitality of human dignity as an
appropriate concern for the courts in vindicating the rights of
77. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at § 2:2.
78. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
79. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
80. Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 138 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t remains true that the restraints and the punishment which
a criminal conviction entails do not place the citizen beyond the ethical
tradition that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every
individual.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 745 (2002) (“Hope was treated in a way antithetical to human dignity-he
was hitched to a post for an extended period of time . . . .”) (emphasis added);
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1992) (quoting the dignity language
from Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
82. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 851 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 361, 372 (1981) (Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
83. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1527 (2012)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 579, 592-93 (1979)
(Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 23233 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 597
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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prisoners in Eighth Amendment cases.
III. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Brown v. Plata84
A.

The Decisions Below

The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata is the
culmination of over twenty years of litigation brought on behalf
of a class of Californian prisoners concerning the State’s
inadequate delivery of health-care and related services.85 The
plaintiff class in Plata was a consolidation of two separate
actions brought against the State of California: Coleman v.
Brown and Brown v. Plata.86
1.Coleman v. Brown
The Coleman plaintiffs, a class of mentally ill prisoners,
originally brought suit against the State of California in 1995
claiming that it had failed to provide mental health care
services required by the Eighth Amendment.87 The district
court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that the provision of
mental health care to inmates in the state fell well below
constitutionally acceptable levels.88 The district court ordered a
battery of remedial measures that attempted to ensure greater
access to mental health care and to improve on-site facilities
and conditions.89 After years of continued failure, the district
court appointed a special master to oversee the prison system’s
rehabilitation.90 Despite such remedial efforts, a continued lack
of progress caused the plaintiffs to request the empanelling of
the three-judge panel under the PLRA to consider the issuance
of a prison population reduction order.91

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
Id. at 1922.
Id. at 1926.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1927-28.
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2.Plata v. Brown
The plaintiffs in the Plata class action originally brought
suit in 2001, alleging the inadequate provision of medical care
to California’s inmate population.92 The State stipulated to the
constitutional violations, seeking to commence the remedial
phase of the litigation.93 Following several years of remedial
failure, in 2005 the court placed California’s prison system into
receivership.94 Less than one year later, the plaintiffs moved to
empanel a three-judge court because of the lack of any
appreciable progress at correcting the underlying violations.95
3.Prospective Relief Under the PLRA
Only a three-judge panel may issue a prison population
reduction order under the PLRA.96 This expresses Congress’s
desire that such orders be granted sparingly and only after
much deliberation. To convene a three-judge panel under the
PLRA, a plaintiff must show that the originating court
previously issued “an order for less intrusive relief that has
failed to remedy the deprivation . . .” of a federal right,97 and
that “the defendant has had a reasonable [opportunity] to
comply with the previous court orders.”98 Once a three-judge
panel has been convened, a prison population reduction order
may be granted if the plaintiffs show, with clear and convincing
evidence, that: (1) that overcrowding is the primary cause of
the constitutional violation;99 (2) that no other relief will be
able to remedy this violation;100 (3) that the relief be narrowly
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the
constitutional violation, and be accomplished through the least
92. Id. at 1926.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1926-27.
95. Id. at 1927-28.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (2006).
97. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i).
98. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii).
99. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i).
100. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii).
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intrusive means;101 and finally (4) that the court “give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety . . .
caused by the relief.”102
4.The Three-Judge Panel’s Decision
The three-judge panel, following a lengthy discovery
process and trial, granted the plaintiffs’ request for a prison
population reduction order. The court issued extensive factual
findings detailing the horrific conditions experienced by
plaintiffs’ class as a result of the overcrowded nature of the
California prison system.103 For instance, suicidal inmates were
placed in holding cells no better than cages for hours on end,
with many committing suicide at a rate almost eighty percent
higher than the national average.104 Inmates suffering from
physical aliments were subjected to similarly deplorable
conditions, leading the court to find that the amount of
preventable deaths in the prison system “was extremely
high.”105 Ultimately, the three-judge panel concluded that a
reduction in the prison population to 137.5 % of capacity within
two years was permissible under the PLRA and would remedy
the system’s constitutional deficiencies, leaving the specifics on
how to achieve that goal to the State’s discretion.106
B.

The Supreme Court Decides

On May 23, 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the threejudge panel’s decision to issue a prison population reduction
order. In a five to four decision,107 Justice Kennedy found that
the panel was properly convened under the PLRA, and that its

101. Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
102. Id.
103. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
104. Id. at 1924.
105. Id. at 1925 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 1928.
107. Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
comprised the Court’s majority affirming the lower court order, whilst Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito voted to reverse. Id.
at 1921.
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decision to grant the prison population reduction order was
properly granted.108 The Court’s opinion was phrased in very
narrow terms, giving the State significant discretion in
determining how best to reach the 137.5% population cap
ordered by the three-judge panel.
Beginning the Court’s discussion is language that strongly
affirms the role of the federal courts in upholding the
constitutional rights of all persons, including prisoners.109 The
Court prominently relied on how the inherent human dignity of
prisoners compelled the Court’s result. Justice Kennedy wrote:
As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners
may be deprived of rights that are fundamental
to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution
demand recognition of certain other rights.
Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity
inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity
animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.110
The Court emphasizes that when individuals are
incarcerated they are deprived of the ability to provide for
themselves the most basic of life’s necessities. For instance,
prisoners depend on the State to provide them with adequate
food and medical care.111 A failure to provide inmates with
these necessities “may actually produce physical torture or a
lingering death.”112 Where the government has neglected its
duties, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, it is up to the
judiciary to ensure that a remedy is provided. While courts
must give some amount of deference to the concerns of prison
administrators, because of their expertise in housing large
numbers of dangerous convicts and legitimate interest in
criminal punishment, the courts cannot permit ongoing
constitutional violations “simply because a remedy would
108. Id. at 1923.
109. Id. at 1928–29.
110. Id. at 1928 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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involve intrusion into the realm of prison administration.”113
The Court’s strong language is crucial to understanding its
holding within the context of prisoners’ rights law. Historically,
courts have been cautious to act with any vigor where inmates
allege constitutional violations concerning conditions of
confinement.114 While the prisoners’ rights movements of the
latter twentieth century gradually called into doubt the notion
that prisoners lose all their liberties upon incarceration,115
Justice Kennedy’s language in this section of the Court’s
opinion is an important step forward in how the federal
judiciary conceives of its role in protecting these rights. The
Court’s opinion affirms the judiciary’s power to correct
constitutional violations in the prison context, and directly
states that the courts must not shirk this responsibility when
doing so is necessary despite the protests of prison officials.116
The Court then considered whether the three-judge panel
was properly convened under the PLRA. The plaintiffs were
required to show that the lower court had previously issued an
order for a less intrusive remedy that failed to rectify the
violation of a federal constitutional right, and that the
defendant had been given an appropriate amount of time to
comply with the lower court’s previous orders.117 Both of these
requirements were met.118 As to the first requirement, the
record was replete with examples of past court orders of a less
intrusive nature than a population reduction order.119
Remedial efforts had been ongoing for over twelve years to no
avail for the Coleman class action plaintiffs, and for nearly five
years for the Plata class action plaintiffs at the time the three-

113. Id. at 1929.
114. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at §§ 1:3, 2:4 (discussing the 19th-20th
Century “hands-off” doctrine and the highly deferential test announced in
Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), applied in many prisoners’ rights cases);
see also Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (giving
great deference to the needs of prison administrators in upholding strip
search of misdemeanor arrestee).
115. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at § 1:4.
116. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006).
118. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1930–31.
119. Id.
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judge panel convened.120 The more difficult question before the
Court was whether the State had been given sufficient time to
comply with these past remedial efforts, especially in light of
the recent appointment of a receiver in the Plata case only one
year earlier.121 The Court declined to read this section of the
PLRA literally as advocated by California.122 To do otherwise
would require that for a period of time no remedial efforts be
undertaken, prolonging the period of the court’s involvement,
anathema to the judiciary’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction.123
While each new remedial order “must be given a reasonable
time to succeed, . . . [this] must be assessed in light of the
entire history of the court’s remedial efforts.”124
Having answered the question of whether the three-judge
panel was properly convened, the Court moved on and
determined that the lower court had not erred in finding that
“crowding [was] the primary cause of the violation of a Federal
right.”125 In making this determination, the Court was required
to give deference to the factual findings of the three-judge
court.126 The record below clearly demonstrated to the Court
that the overcrowding of California’s prisons had a drastic
impact on the provision of medical care.127 Justice Kennedy
pointed out that the vacancy rates for key medical personnel
ranged from twenty percent for surgeons, to over fifty percent
for psychiatrists.128 Furthermore, even if an overwhelming
majority of those positions could be have been filled with
proficient medical professionals, the State’s prisons still lacked
the necessary space for the additional personnel to deliver
adequate care to the prisoner population.129 The overcrowding
was also the primary cause of the significant delays in

120. Id. at 1930.
121. Id. at 1931.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) (2006).
126. Plata, 131 U.S. at 1932 (citing Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499
U.S. 225, 233 (1991)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1933.
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treatment to both mentally ill and physically ill inmates.130 In
the most extreme cases, these delays in treatment gave sick
inmates sufficient time to commit suicide when this result may
have been entirely preventable.131 While overcrowding took a
toll on the delivery of medical care, it also fostered unsafe and
unsanitary conditions creating more sickness to be treated,
compounding the problems of delivery.132 In one instance,
prison staff did not learn about the preventable death of an
inmate, who had been assaulted, until several hours
afterwards, because of severe overcrowding.133 In another case,
two inmates were given the opportunity to hang themselves
after they had been placed in cells containing noose attachment
points that could have easily been removed.134 The attachment
points had not been removed because prison officials had no
place to put the inmates while the repair was being made.135
Further, increased violence in overcrowded prisons has
required administrators to increasingly rely on lockdowns to
maintain order.136 During these lockdowns prisoners must
either be escorted to the medical facilities or the medical
personnel must be brought to the prisoners.137 This has
increased the strain placed on the prison medical system, and
has resulted in the suspension of programming specifically
designed to treat mentally ill prisoners.138
The Court also rejected the contention raised by the
defendants, that the three-judge panel failed to allow enough
time for adequate discovery prior to trial and that accordingly,
the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence about current
prison conditions.139 The three-judge panel extensively relied
upon expert testimony of near-current prison conditions, and
maintained that “[o]rderly trial management may require

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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discovery deadlines . . . .”140 This result was further compelled
by the fact that the three-judge panel’s decision was limited to
granting a remedy rather than a re-litigation of the
constitutional
violations
alleged.141
Discovery
was
appropriately limited with these goals in mind.
Although the plaintiffs admitted that the violation of their
constitutional rights was caused by other factors in addition to
overcrowding, such an admission did not serve to invalidate the
three-judge panel’s conclusion that the overcrowding was the
primary cause of these violations.142 To find that overcrowding
was the primary cause of the violation, it must be found that
overcrowding was “the foremost, chief, or principal cause of the
violation.”143 General canons of statutory interpretation
suggest that if Congress intended that overcrowding be the
only cause of the violation, it would have expressly said so
when the PLRA was enacted into law.144 The Court stressed
that the PLRA should not be construed so as to place strictures
on a federal court’s power to fabricate “practical remedies when
confronted with complex and intractable constitutional
violations.”145
The Court next considered whether the three-judge panel
appropriately found, by clear and convincing evidence, that “no
other relief will remedy the violation . . .”146 of the protected
right.147 The Court considered, and rejected the argument of
the State that it could adequately remedy the ongoing
constitutional violations through the construction of new
facilities, out-of-state transfers of prisoners, increased hiring of
medical personnel, continued adherence to the work of the
special master and receiver, or a combination of these four
remedies.148 The State’s proposal to remedy the constitutional
violations by increasing out-of-state prison transfers was

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1936.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1937.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii) (2006).
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1937.
Id.
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inadequate because such transfers are considered a population
reduction by the PLRA.149 Even if California could transfer a
sufficient number of prisoners out-of-state to alleviate the
overcrowding, the remedy, a form of population reduction,
would not technically be considered a less restrictive
alternative to the three-judge panel’s order.150 The Court also
rejected the State’s argument that it can build its way out of
the overcrowding problem, noting California’s current fiscal
crisis.151 The State’s inability to construct new medical facilities
also undercuts the State’s argument that a remedy could be
achieved through hiring additional personnel. Even if a
sufficient number of medical personnel were hired, there would
still be insufficient space in which the additional personnel
could work.152
The Court also rejected the argument that the special
master in Coleman and the receiver in Plata should be given
more time to continue their efforts at remedying the
inadequacies inherent in the prison system’s medical care
delivery.153 Reports filed by the receiver and special master
essentially stated that continued efforts on their part would fail
to correct the system unless something was done to alleviate
the problem posed by the overcrowding.154 The Court also found
the State’s final argument, that all of the aforementioned
remedies combined could remedy the ongoing constitutional
violations, to be unpersuasive. Absent a population reduction,
all of the State’s solutions ultimately required California to
expend large sums of money, a fiscal impossibility at the
current time.155 Furthermore, the State’s attempts to remedy
this situation had been ongoing for nearly two decades,
suggesting that the current “solutions” were insufficient to
solve the problem.156
Under the PLRA prospective relief must be narrowly

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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drawn, extend no further than is necessary to alleviate the
violation, and must be the least intrusive means necessary to
remedy the violation of a federal right.157 In making this
determination, courts are required to “give substantial weight
to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system.”158 The State argued that the collateral
consequences of the prisoner release order is evidence that the
remedy is not narrowly tailored, and that as a result, its sweep
is far too broad.159 An order is not excessively broad simply
because it has effects that will be felt beyond the plaintiffs’
class. For a remedy’s scope to be narrowly tailored, it must be
proportional to the violation that it purports to correct.160
Simply put, collateral effects that emanate from the correction
of a constitutional violation do not, alone, render a remedy
inappropriate under the PLRA.161 Collateral effects violate the
narrowly tailored requirement only when the courts seek to
alter prison conditions outside of the scope of the constitutional
violation alleged by the plaintiffs.162 Justice Kennedy pointed
out that “[e]ven prisoners with no present physical or mental
illness may become afflicted, and all prisoners in California are
at risk so long as the State continues to provide inadequate
care.”163 The Court noted the associated dangers in releasing
prisoners only within the plaintiff class, especially with regards
to the high recidivism rates among the mentally ill.164 The
overcrowding problem would not be solved as those prisoners
would inevitably find themselves back in prison before too long,
solving the overcrowding problem not one bit. Releasing those
individuals who are less likely to commit “fresh” crimes would
go a long way to truly relieve the pressure on the prison
medical care system caused by overcrowding. Importantly, the
three-judge panel’s prisoner release order gives:

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (2006).
Id.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939.
Id. at 1939-40.
Id. at 1940
Id.
Id.
Id.
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[T]he State substantial flexibility to determine
who should be released. If the State truly
believes that a release order limited to sick and
mentally ill inmates would be preferable to the
order entered by the three-judge court, the State
can move the three-judge court for modification
of the order on that basis.165
The lower court’s remedy was not overbroad because it
targeted the entire California prison system instead of each
individual prison facility. It is undisputed that the
constitutional violations are systemic in nature.166 This
approach is logical because focusing on the entirety of the state
prison system allows California greater discretion in how it
achieves the population numbers ordered by the lower court.167
Because of the systemic nature of this approach, each prison
facility need not reach a population of 137.5 % of maximum
capacity.168 Some of the State’s prison populations may be well
in excess of that limit, so long as other facilities are able to fall
below that number, thus reducing the population levels in the
entire system to the parameters set out by the lower court’s
order.169 This systemic approach gives the State flexibility in
how it decides to comply with the three-judge panel’s order,
allowing it to take into account the very real differences
between many of the State’s prison facilities. For instance, the
State may be able to shift prisoners to facilities that are better
able to handle overcrowding without causing further
constitutional violations.170 Importantly, the lower court’s order
leaves those decisions up to the State, and not unelected, lifetenured federal judges.171 The Court, in addition to stressing
the deference given to the State by the lower court’s order, also
indicated that the State is free to move the three-judge panel

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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for modification of the remedial order.172 Moving the threejudge panel to modify the remedial order is entitled to serious
consideration as “time and experience . . . reveal targeted and
effective remedies that will end the constitutional violations
even without a significant decrease in the general prison
population.”173
Next the Court considered whether the three-judge panel
gave “substantial weight” to the effects of a prisoner release
order on public safety in accordance with the requirements of
the PLRA.174 The PLRA’s language does not require the court
to ensure that there be no adverse effects resulting from a
release order, only that “substantial weight” be given to
possible detrimental outcomes in deciding to order a population
reduction. The lower court gave significant attention to the
issue of public safety; ten days of trial were allocated to this
issue, and the court frequently referred to the problem of public
safety in its final opinion.175 Weighing these possible outcomes,
it was acceptable for the panel to rely on expert testimony from
prison administrators throughout the country.176 When making
difficult factual findings, reliance on informed expert testimony
is indispensable for the court to fashion injunctive relief
appropriate to remedy constitutional violations. The experts
that testified before the three-judge panel “testified on the
basis of empirical evidence and extensive experience in the
field of prison administration.”177 Several points were salient to
the Court’s conclusion that the three-judge panel fulfilled its
statutory goal in that regard. Many of the experts testified that
prison populations can be reduced in a manner that does not
increase crime, but may actually have the effect of promoting
and improving the public safety.178 Additionally, the experts
testified about statistical evidence demonstrating that prison
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006). The PLRA requires that the
court give “substantial weight” to possible detrimental outcomes when
deciding to order a population reduction. Id. A court is not required to ensure
no adverse effects will result from a release order.
175. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1941.
176. Id. at 1942.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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populations have been lowered in other jurisdictions without
also undermining the public safety.179 Other methods available
to prison administrators, like the use of good-time credits to
release prisoners less likely to be recidivist, and the diversion
of low-risk offenders to community programs also serves to
reduce overcrowding, while minimally affecting public safety.180
Once again, the State has significant discretion in deciding how
best to comply with the three-judge panel’s order. “The decision
to leave details of implementation to the State’s discretion
protect[s] public safety by leaving sensitive policy decisions to
responsible and competent state officials.”181
Penultimately, the Court considered whether the threejudge panel had erred in concluding that California prison
population should be reduced to 137.5% of capacity in order to
bring the system into compliance with the Constitution.182
Again, the Court considered whether the lower court gave
substantial weight to public safety concerns and whether the
remedy was narrowly tailored to the constitutional violation.183
The narrow tailoring requirement demands that the court
order the release only of the fewest prisoners necessary to
remedy the constitutional violation. The lower court did not
commit clear error by capping the prison population at 137.5%;
in fact the Court found evidence that even a more drastic
remedy would have been appropriate.184 Contrary to the State’s
argument, the Court found no evidence that the experts who
testified before the lower court improperly expressed their own
policy preferences instead of the narrowest cure for the ongoing
constitutional violations.185 The lower court’s decision was
supported by evidence that the problems posed by
overcrowding could be cured with a population cap of anywhere
between 130 % and 145 % of prison capacity.186 The lower court
did not act improperly by “splitting the difference,” especially

179.
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since it had given both sides a chance to present their views on
the issue and where scientific precision may be impossible to
achieve.187
Finally, the Court considered whether the three-judge
panel acted properly by ordering the State to reduce its prison
population to 137.5 % of design capacity within a two-year time
span.188 This compliance period would not commence until after
the Court’s decision was announced, meaning that the State
had, up until this time, been given a two-year head start.189 In
that time, the State had reduced the prison population by some
nine thousand inmates, and “[began] to implement measures to
shift ‘thousands’ of additional prisoners to county facilities.”190
However, if the State requests an extension, the three-judge
panel should “remain open to a showing or demonstration by
either party that the injunction should be altered . . . .”191 The
State has thus far failed to move the three-judge panel to
extend the deadline. The Court baldly suggested that if the
State moved to extend the deadline, that request should be
granted.192
IV. The Future of Human Dignity & the Constitution?
A.

In General

The importance of Plata on prisoners’ rights law will
become clear only if and when its underlying logic is applied in
the future. The Court affirmed not just the power of the federal
courts to enforce constitutional rights of prisoners, but also
held, using strong and deliberate language, that prisoners’
human dignity animates the rights afforded them by the
Eighth Amendment. Taken together, these two concepts
encourage the courts to take a more active role in vindicating
the constitutional rights of the imprisoned. In Plata, by
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arguing that human dignity animates the Eighth Amendment
protections afforded prisoners, the Court suggests that the
judiciary cannot hide behind deference to the decisions of
prison administrators and decline to enforce the rights of
prisoners where such egregious violations of constitutional
rights persist.193 However, one must be careful in overstating
the importance of this rule. The magnitude of the
constitutional violations at issue in Plata is quite rare. Justice
Kennedy might simply be marking out the boundaries; where
the clear and continuous violations of the Eighth Amendment
mandate the imposition of a drastic remedy. In that case,
Plata serves merely as an outlier.
The Court’s holding is all the more interesting in light of
the general scholarly consensus that the PLRA has acted to
restrict the prisoners’ access to the legal system.194 This
restriction would prevent prisoners from preserving their
constitutional rights.195 However, at the very least the Plata
decision is a sign that the judiciary will not use the PLRA to
intentionally frustrate the ability of prisoners to access the
legal system, which is in essence the approach urged by Justice
Scalia in his dissent:
There comes before us, now and then, a case
whose proper outcome is so clearly indicated by
tradition and common sense, that its decision
ought to shape the law, rather than vice versa.
One would think that, before allowing the decree
of a federal district court to release 46,000
193. Id. at 1929.
194. See generally Michael B. Mushlin, Unlocking the Courthouse Door:
Removing the Barrier of the PLRA’s Physical Injury Requirement to Permit
Meaningful Judicial Oversight of Abuses in Supermax Prisons and Isolation
Units, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 268 (2012) (discussing how the PLRA’s
requirement permitting prisoners to bring claims of mental or emotional
injury only if accompanied by some non-de minimis physical injury has
severely restricted prisoners’ access to the courts specifically erecting a
barrier between the Constitution and prisoners held in solitary confinement);
Margo Schlanger, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons:
The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 139 (2008); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555,
passim (2003).
195. See sources cited supra note 194.
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convicted felons, this Court would bend every
effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid
that outrageous result.196
Despite the fears of judicial activism espoused by the
dissenting justices,197 the Court’s opinion is a leading example
of “judicial restraint.” The majority opinion tightly applies the
various applicable sections of the PLRA, and gives great
deference to the lower court’s findings of fact. Additionally, the
prisoner release order itself gives discretion to state officials in
determining the precise measures by which the State’s prisoner
population will be reduced.198
Remedying violations of constitutional rights, especially
those of unpopular minority groups, has been one of the most
important roles of the federal courts since World War II.
Respect for human dignity should play a part in this calculus,
as it is integral to any understanding of the Eighth
Amendment. Plata recognizes that violations of human dignity
provide clear examples of instances where the courts must act
to effectuate constitutional guarantees. The problem with using
human dignity as a tool of constitutional interpretation results
from the ambiguity of the term itself, and therefore, the
indefiniteness of determining when government action crosses
that purported line. It may be that the courts, possibly like in
Plata, are reduced to analyzing these questions in a manner
similar to Justice Potter Stewart’s famous “I know it when I
see it” retort in Jacobellis v. Ohio.199
B.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: An About-Face
on Human Dignity?

One case decided in 2012, Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders,200 raises significant questions about the breadth of
the Plata decision, particularly the relevance of human dignity

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1950, 1959 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1920 (majority opinion).
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
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to constitutional analysis. The Court once again pays
significant deference to the concerns of prison administrators
allowing for the proliferation of troublesome practices at the
expense of prisoners.201 Most unsettling is that Justice
Kennedy is the author of the Court’s opinion in Florence.202 At
issue in Florence was whether, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, prison officials could subject a detainee
introduced into the general prison population to a visual strip
search.203 Albert Florence had been arrested seven years prior
to the events at issue before the Court for fleeing from the
police. He plead to the lesser of the offenses charged and was
sentenced to pay a fine, due in monthly installments.204
Florence fell behind on these payments, and a bench warrant
for his arrest was issued after he failed to make an appearance
at an enforcement hearing. He caught up on his payments, but
the bench warrant was somehow never removed from the police
computer system.205 In 2005, Florence was pulled over by the
police while driving in Burlington County with his wife. The
police proceeded to arrest Florence because of the outstanding
bench warrant that had never been removed from the computer
system. Florence was detained at two separate detention
facilities where he was subject to a visual “strip search” prior to
being introduced to the general prison population.206 The
search procedures utilized by each detention center required
detainees to remove all of their clothing while officers would
check for contraband, wounds, and gang-related body marks.

201. See id. In fact, Justice Kennedy begins his opinion with a paean to
the judicial deference due institutional administrators: “Correctional officials
have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not
made less secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in on their
bodies.” Id. at 1513.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1514.
205. Id.
206. Id. The Court was uncomfortable with using the term “strip search”
to describe the search procedure endured by Florence because of its relative
imprecision. The Court noted that the term could be applied to a broad array
of search procedures, including physical searches of detainees’ bodies. Query
whether the Court’s discomfort with using the term “strip search” to describe
the treatment received by Florence aided its ultimate decision to defer to
prison administrators. See id. at 1515.
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Officers would also, without touching, peruse detainees’
mouths and genital areas. These procedures applied to every
individual processed by the detention centers.207
Florence argued that the mandatory strip search
procedures were unconstitutional as applied to individuals
arrested for minor offenses. Strip searches of this nature could
be utilized only if officials had reasonable suspicion that a
detainee was concealing contraband.208 The district court
agreed with Florence and found the challenged strip search
policy unconstitutional. The Third Circuit reversed, finding
that the challenged search procedures properly balanced the
privacy interests of the detainees with the security needs of the
detention centers.209
Finding the strip search procedures employed against
Florence constitutionally permissible, the Court anchored its
analysis in a sympathetic discussion of the tough decisions
faced by prison administrators and the high degree of deference
that courts should give to those decisions.210 Acknowledging
that the constitutionality of a particular search method must
be analyzed by balancing the State’s need for search against its
invasion into personal privacy,211 much of the Court’s opinion
focused on the threats to prison security that would ensue if
prison officials were unable to conduct visual strip searches,
even on individuals detained for petty offenses.212 An individual
may be arrested for petty offenses without a warrant by virtue
of the Court’s decision in Atwater v. Lago Vista.213 The parade
of horribles trotted out by the majority in this regard included
gang violence, contagious diseases, and contraband-induced
violence.214 The Court even went out of its way to suggest that
individuals arrested for petty offenses may in some cases turn

207. Id. at 1514
208. Id. at 1515.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1515 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85, 89 (1987)).
Indeed, the Court’s analysis opens by stating: “The difficulties of operating a
detention center must not be underestimated by the courts.” Id.
211. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
212. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518-22.
213. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
214. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518-20.
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out to be some of the most dangerous criminals imaginable,
and that this is a reasonable concern for prison officials to
consider when crafting a detainee search policy.215 Finally, the
Court’s opinion dwelled upon the general impracticability of
administering the “reasonable suspicion” approach favored by
the plaintiff in Florence. Prison administrators have a strong
interest in possessing easily administrable rules that a
“reasonable suspicion” test would greatly impair.216 This
evidence led Justice Kennedy to conclude in Florence that
submitting all individuals entering detention facilities,
regardless of the charged offense, to a strip search struck “a
reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of
the [prison] institutions.”217 The evidence suggested to the
Court that the needs of prison administrators outweighed
prisoners’ privacy interests despite the affront to dignity
engendered by invasive strip searches policies.
Florence clearly affects how one must view Plata’s broader
impact on prisoners’ rights issues and the larger meaning of
human dignity as a constitutional value. The Court in Plata
was quick to begin its discussion of the legal issues by
highlighting the inherent rights and liberties retained by
prisoners, despite their lawful imprisonment.218 In contrast,
Florence focuses almost entirely on the deference that courts
must give to prison administrators, highlighting the dangers
that undermine an orderly prison system.219 Furthermore, the
Court’s opinion is replete with language espousing strong
judicial deference to the concerns of prison administrators.220
215. Id. at 1520. The Court also suggested that persons arrested for
minor offenses may be susceptible to coercion by others to smuggle
contraband into prison, and that the effect of treating low level offenders
differently from individuals who have committed more serious offenses would
lead to a greater amount of contraband entering the detention center. Id. at
1521.
216. Id. at 1522.
217. Id. at 1523.
218. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
219. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515.
220. Some examples of the Court’s language are instructive. The opinion
begins as follows: “Correctional officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a
responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by reason of what
new detainees may carry in on their bodies.” Id. at 1513. “Maintaining safety
and order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials
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Most surprising is Justice Kennedy’s insinuation that strip
searches of low-level offenders are always constitutionally
permissible. Yet, this sweeping rule in Florence is at odds with
the concerns for human dignity held by Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Plata. That such an insinuation is present in
Florence is made clear by the separate concurring opinions
written by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.221 It
remained Justice Breyer’s responsibility in his dissenting
opinion to remind the Court of the important dignity interests
retained by prisoners and of the affront to that dignity caused
by an invasive strip search policy, such as the one in
Florence.222 Thus human dignity as a constitutional value
clearly did not play as prominent a role in the Florence decision
as it had in Plata only one year earlier. This is troubling
because it casts doubt on the durability of the concept of
human dignity as a readily discernible constitutional value,
particularly when the same Justice authors the contrasting
opinions. Justice Kennedy’s decision to elide any discussion of
human dignity in Florence suggests that the concept of human
dignity may be one of style rather than of substance. If the
phrase “human dignity” is used only as a means to justify
opinions that vindicate individual rights rather than as a
normative principle that compels the result in such a case, then
the concept runs the risk of becoming a superfluous turn of
phrase devoid of any concrete legal meaning.
Despite the seemingly huge substantive disparities that
exist between Plata and Florence, the cases may be
reconcilable. The alleged constitutional violations at issue in
who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the
problems they face.” Id. at 1515. “People detained for minor offenses can turn
out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals . . . . Reasonable
correctional officials could conclude these uncertainties mean they must
conduct the same thorough search of everyone who will be admitted to their
facilities.” Id. at 1520.
221. Id. at 1523-24 (Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J., concurring). “The Court
makes a persuasive case for the general applicability of the rule it announces.
The Court is nonetheless wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions . . .
.”Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
222. Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “Those confined in prison retain
basic constitutional rights . . . . I doubt that we seriously disagree about the
nature of the strip search or about how the serious affront to human dignity
and to individual privacy that it presents.” Id. at 1525, 1527.
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each case are arguably of different magnitude. In Plata, the
Court considered the appropriateness of remedial efforts
pertaining to long-standing and systemic constitutional
violations that directly impacted the immediate health and
safety of thousands of inmates held in California’s prisons.223 In
Florence, the alleged violation occurred during a close visual
inspection of an arrestee’s naked body by jail officials.224 Strip
searches implicate important privacy interests of prisoners,
however, for Justice Kennedy, the invasion of privacy in
Florence did not rise to an affront to human dignity in the same
way that it had in Plata.
Judicial policies of deference may also explain the
similarity of results in both cases. In Plata the Court was
reviewing the decision of a lower court as to the
appropriateness of a particular remedial measure. Because of
the lower court’s proximity to the factual determinations, the
Supreme Court was obliged to give deference to its findings of
fact so long as the lower court did not make a “mistake.”225 In
Florence the Court felt compelled to give deference to the
concerns of administrators unless their reasoning was found to
be unreasonable when compared to the privacy interests of the
detainees.226 Finally, the Court in Plata was not tasked with
determining whether the California medical care delivery
system was constitutionally deficient; the Court needed to
decide only the propriety of the remedy granted by the threejudge court.227 In contrast, the Court in Florence considered the
constitutionality of a prison strip search policy on the merits
rather than simply assuming that a constitutional claim was
valid in the first place. While the Plata Court discussed the
underlying factual claims that gave rise to the constitutional
challenge, it was not asked to specifically weigh in on the
223. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922.
224. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.
225. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929-30. “The three-judge court’s findings of
fact may be reversed only if this Court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 1930 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
226. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517.
227. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926. “The [three-judge] court reasoned that
its decision was limited to the issue of remedy and that the merits of the
constitutional violation had already been determined.” Id. at 1935.
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applicability of the Eighth Amendment in the same way that it
discussed the Fourth Amendment in Florence.
Both Florence and Plata demonstrate the difficulty that
inheres in using human dignity to understand the substantive
protections of the constitution. What is the real difference
between the violations at issue in either case? There is no easy
way to make these distinctions. This legal analysis is
unsatisfying, leaving us without any ability to distinguish
between those cases where human dignity will be implicated,
and those where it will not. Human dignity as a constitutional
value should not remain “off the table” until the point when we
can craft a test for readily determining when, and if, there is a
constitutional violation. While Plata seems to open a door for
more active judicial involvement in prisoners’ rights cases,
Florence certainly inspires some level of caution. Plata perhaps
stands as an example of the extreme; the facts presented such
an egregious situation that the Court had to say to prison
administrators that enough was enough. Despite cases like
Florence, it is not likely that the Court will completely ignore
human dignity considerations when deciding prisoners’ rights
cases. Human dignity’s impact on such decisions will merely be
limited to those cases that present the most egregious
examples of prisoner treatment, cases very much akin to those
which “shock the conscience” of the judiciary in cases decided
under the Fourteenth Amendment.228 Perhaps what makes the
Court’s decision in Florence so unsettling is that instead of
declaring that the strip search policy undermined the plaintiff’s
human dignity, the Court simply ignored the implications of
that policy on human dignity altogether. If the Court had
couched its argument in favor of upholding the strip search
policy, by stating that the policy did not denigrate the
plaintiff’s dignity, the court would at least provide some
content to that principal in delineating what level of conduct
improperly affect an individual’s human dignity. By failing to
mention human dignity altogether, the court did nothing the
assist lower courts, and the nation, in determining what it
means when it uses that phrase. Human dignity, as a value
embodied by the Constitution, is more than a nebulous concept,

228. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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as decisions like Plata make clear, but the Court needs to
consistently apply the concept, rather than mention it only
where it is convenient to do so.
V.

Conclusion

Human dignity, a constitutional principle that is important
to the protection and vindication of individual rights, is
conceptually still very much in its intellectual infancy. Human
dignity is a principal that has been increasingly utilized by the
Court over the past fifty years, and has been legitimized at a
breakneck pace. The Plata decision sets a high-water mark for
the application of human dignity as an underlying
constitutional value in the field of prisoners’ rights. Plata
suggests that the Court will be willing to intervene when it
finds that the constitutional rights of an exceedingly unpopular
minority have been violated. Yet, this is in tension with the
usual judicial proclivity towards deference to prison
administrators. However momentous the decision in Plata, one
must be careful in prognosticating too far into the future when
it comes to the Supreme Court in this field of constitutional
law. In less than a year after Plata, the Court’s decision in
Florence, also written by Justice Kennedy, should make any
optimist pause before overestimating the magnitude of
importance of human dignity as a value in constitutional
interpretation. The Court has indicated that it will still defer,
in many cases, to the concerns expressed by prison
administrators.
Whether the forceful language concerning human dignity
used by the majority in Plata shall be reserved to only those
cases that present the most egregious examples of prisoner
abuse remains to be seen. Even if human dignity has its
greatest constitutional application only where conduct shocks
the judicial conscience, this more consistent approach will
allow for the future development and legal solidity of a value
that animates the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution.
The “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society”229 require us to constantly strive to
229. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
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reevaluate how we treat all in our society, even those who have
committed great offenses. Acknowledging the human dignity of
prisoners, as the Court did in Plata, merely demonstrates a
continued commitment and strong reaffirmation to one of the
principals enshrined in the Constitution.
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